THE DE FACTO TERMINATION OF ALASKA NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY: AN ANOMALY IN AN ERA OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Benjamin
L Overview of Native American Law'
The most important principles of federal law pertaining to Native Americans -those defining the roles and respective powers of the numerous tribes, federal government, and states -developed as part of the federal common law?' Congress made and continues to make efforts to modify those principles, resulting in the various historical federal Indian policies, but their core remains.' One overarching principle is the trust doctrine, which describes the relationship between the federal government and Native Americans and their respective roles.' Another significant concept inheres in tribal sovereignty principles, which defines the source and scope of the tribes' authority.' These principles, and the congressional policies seeking to modify them, are also generally applicable to Alaska Natives, as the following overview explains.
A. Trust Doctrine'
Critical to an understanding of the context of tribal sovereignty and the impetus behind the various past federal Indian policies is an awareness of the nature of the relationship of Native Americans to the federal government. The relationship is known as a trust relationship, with Congress as trustee, Native Americans as the beneficiaries, and Native Americans' real property and natural resources as the corpus, whereby the federal government owes a fiduciary duty or obligation to Native Americans." One commentator defined the trusteeship as "the legal and moral duty of the United States to assist Indians in the protection of their property and rights."' This relationship has its advantages, but its attendant disadvantages are quite significant.
(discussing tribal sovereignty).
24. See discussion infra Part LC (discussing the historical and present federal Indian policies).
25. See discussion infra Part L.A (discussing the trust doctrine).
26.
See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing tribal sovereignty). 27. See discussion infra Part I.D (discussing the context of Alaska Native sovereignty). 28. The trust doctrine arose from dicta in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See COHEN, supra note 7, at 220. The Cherokee Nation sought to bring suit against Georgia under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 15. In holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that, although Indian tribes are "states," they are not foreign states within the meaning of article Ill. Id. at 16-20. Instead, tribes are "more correctly denominated domestic dependent nations. ... Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id. at 17. Marshall's basis for the relationship was for the necessary protection of the tribes. Id. at 17-18. Later language in the opinion suggests that Marshall viewed Congress as the federal branch charged with the responsibility of being the guardian or trustee for Native Americans. "If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future." Id. at 20. Despite the dictum status of much of the opinion, many later cases have cited Cherokee Nation, eAtch one reinforcing the trust relationship between Native Americans and the federal government. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225-26 (1983) [Vol. 24
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The trust doctrine provides several advantages for Native Americans' First, as land primarily constitutes the corpus of the trust, the federal government protects both the land itself and income derived therefrom?' Second, the federal government's role as trustee requires it to represent Native Americans in actions affecting their trust property 3 Third, Native Americans benefit from the federal government's management of trust funds.' Fourth, the trust relationship supports federal action discriminating in favor of Native Americans based on the rationale that it is based on a political rather than a racial classification 3 Finally, the trust relationship protects Native Americans from federal government action that is inconsistent with its role as trustee. 6 Despite the advantages, there are several serious disadvantages to the trust relationship. First, federal control over trust lands and resources necessarily prevents the tribes and its members from making decisions affecting their future.' Second, a degree of paternalism inheres in the federal trust responsibility, which may influence federal action in a manner inconsistent with the tribes' wishes? 8 Third, several decisions of the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which looked to the trust doctrine as a source of plenary power over Native Americans as individuals, evince a disadvantage 9 The Court relied on the doctrine to uphold Congress's enactment of the Major Crimes Act, which claimed federal jurisdiction over specific serious crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. ' The Court also cited the trust 31 641 (1977) (upholding application of federal criminal jurisdictional statute to an Indian when doing so would subject defendant to felony murder rule not applicable in prosecutions of non-Indians in state court for same offense)).
36. Id. at 44. The Supreme Court has allowed a breach of trust suit against the United States for its mismanagement of resources on trust lands; however, the Court read the Indian Tucker Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994), which waives sovereign immunity for claims by Indians against the federal government, to require an independent statutory source for a trust duty. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). Although the Mitchell Court relied on traditional private trust principles to define the trust duty, the Court refused to apply the same standards when the federal government represented conflicting interests in court proceedings without the beneficiary tribe's consent. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983 43 Although the Court subsequently repudiated the trust doctrine as a separate source of power over American Indians, the federal government still claims the plenary power, which the Court now upholds as supported by the Indian Commerce Clause' Thus, the federal government's plenary power over Native American affairs originatd from the trust doctrine.
Considering the actions justified by the plenary power, it is a significant disadvantage of the trust doctrine."
the question of whether Congress had the constitutional power to enact the Major Crimes Act. Id. at 375-76. After admitting that a statute with the sole purpose of prohibiting crimes committed by Indians in Indian country had little if anything to do with commerce, the Court rejected the Commerce Clause as a source of power. Id. at 378-79. To uphold the constitutionality of the act, the Court chose instead to rely on the trust relationship as a basis for the power necessary to enact such an act, claiming that such a power was necessary to their protection. It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.... From their very weakness and helplessness, so laTgely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. Id. at 383-84.
42. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Lone Wolf was a class action suit in which members of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes claimed that Congress violated the Due Process Clause and acted inconsistently with the Treaty of Medicine Lodge. Id. at 564. The treaty required the approval of three-quarters of the tribal members for future land cessions, and the plaintiffs had alleged that Congress enacted a "surplus lands" act by fraudulently securing the minimum amount of signatures. Id. at 554, 564. The Lone Wolf Court resolved the issue by acknowledging that Congress possessed the power to abrogate Indian treaties. Id. at 566. In so doing, the Court relied upon the "status of the contracting Indians and the relation of dependency" to support its proposition that "[pilenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning." Id. at 564-65. Thus, the trust relationship served as a basis for Congress' assertion of plenary power over the Indians through the abrogation of Indian treaties.
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The existence of the trust relationship inescapably affects tribal sovereignty, as its various advantages and disadvantages all seem to have an impact on it. Its mere existence, through the protections that it provides to the trust property, incidentally protects tribal sovereignty at the same time. On the other hand, the plenary power that arose from the trust doctrine has the potential of destroying tribal sovereignty as well. To more fully comprehend the trust doctrine's possible role, an examination of tribal sovereignty follows.
B. Tribal Sovereignty
Recognition of tribal sovereignty is an acknowledgement of a tribe's right and power of self-government. 7 This particular notion of sovereignty is unlike the commonly understood sovereign status of the Union, its member states, or foreign countries.' Rather, tribal, sovereignty is judicially understood as sovereignty limited by circumstance and shaped by the history of the interaction between European settlers and American Indians."
9 As a result of this interaction, tribal sovereignty is neither limitless nor independent -its scope is predicated on its recognition by the federal government.
The federal government's power to so define, by recognition, the scope of tribal sovereignty arose gradually, through judicial opinion and congressional
impulse." The scope of tribal sovereignty became dependent on the existence of "Indian country" -statutorily defined and judicially ascertained -to the extent where, in the absence of Indian country, tribal sovereignty is limited to a group's members!' It is this interplay between recognizing tribal status and jurisdiction via Indian country that has led to the anomalous situation of Alaska Native sovereignty. To better understand the nature of that situation, it is necessary to examine the origin, prerequisites, and scope of tribal sovereignty. . Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previously exercised. By specific treaty provision they yielded up other sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of its plenary control, Congress has removed still others.") (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (footnote omitted)).
50.
See discussion infra Part I.B.1 (describing origin of tribal sovereignty) and Part I.B.2 (explaining tribal sovereignty prerequisites).
51. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.b (discussing the existence of Indian country as a prerequisite to tribal sovereignty) and Part I.B.3 (describing impact of Indian country on scope of tribal sovereignty).
Origin of Tribal Sovereignty
Prior to European settlement, American Indians maintained tribal governments, albeit in a multitude of different forms. These self-governing bodies exercised powers in conformity with a modem role of government, acting as political bodies in war and foreign affairs and legal bodies through informal social control! 3 Tribal governments were thus historically sovereign entities that exercised their own autonomy over tribal matters. 
Tribal Sovereignty Prerequisites
There are two prerequisites that tribes must meet to successfully assert their sovereignty. First, the native community seeking to assert its sovereignty must constitute a "tribe." 58. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.b (discussing jurisdiction as a prerequisite).
59.
See note 57 supra (providing references for discussions of "tribe" under federal law); see also sources cited infra note 71 (referring to the tribe and Indian country analysis as a threshold issue for determining sovereignty).
60. Developing a definition of tribe was originally necessary in treaty-making to identify groups as political entities and in establishing which Native American groups were covered by certain legislation, but has since become necessary for determining eligibility for federal programs. COHEN, supra note 1, at 3.
61. See supra note 60 (discussing historical purposes). 62. Recognition of tribal status is a necessary corollary to the Commerce Clauses grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce with "Indian tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; COHEN, supra note 7, at 3; CLINTON Er AL., supra note 57, at 82. The power to determine tribal status for political purposes was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
63. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (1994) (defining an "Indian tribe" for purposes of Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act as "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act... which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians"); 25 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (using same definition of "Indian tribe" for purposes of Indian health care); 25 U.S.C. § 2026(14) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (using same definition of "tribe" for purposes of Bureau of Indian Affairs programs); 25 U.S.C. 2703(5) (1994) (defining an "Indian tribe" for purposes of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians which -(A) is recognized as eligible by the Secretary for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians, and (B) is recognized as possessing powers of self-government").
64. Tribes may invoke administrative proceedings for federal recognition as a tribe with the its own determination of tribal status.
Tribal status is a function of a legal rather than an ethnological definition of tribe.' However, there is no standard legal definition, as it will vary depending on the particular use for which tribe is defined. 67 For recognition by the Department of the Interior, the legal definition consists of a set of criteria which the department promulgated in response to a congressional mandate to publish annually a list of federally recognized tribes.' The criteria that petitioning tribes must meet emphasize their political authority, membership roots, and community characteristics."
Tribal status is the first prerequisite to tribal sovereignty; jurisdiction is the second. The following explains the role of jurisdiction as a prerequisite to tribal sovereignty, the jurisdictional term of art being "Indian country." jurisdiction over its members, whether it has personal jurisdiction over nonmembers and non-Indians will depend on the particular conception of sovereignty employed by courts reviewing tribal action. This Article discusses two competing conceptions of tribal sovereignty in part I.B.3 infra. Under federal law, a function of the determination as to what conception prevails is whether the land over which the tribe seeks to assert its sovereignty qualifies as "Indian country."
Indian country is the applicable legal term for most purposes of allocating federal jurisdiction over Native American land! 2 Although its definition comes from the United States criminal code,' the Supreme Court held that it also applies to issues of civil and tribal jurisdiction.' Despite it being a term of art for allocating federal jurisdiction, the definition of Indian country includes virtually all tribal land under federal supervision; 7 consequently, courts also determine the boundaries of a tribe's territory in terms of Indian country. Thus, a court's finding that Indian country does or does not exist essentially determines whether the tribe has jurisdiction over its landbase as well.
76
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines Indian country as including reservations, dependent Indian communities, and allotments.' The meanings of reservations and allotments are relatively straightforward, but the meaning of dependent Indian communities has led courts to devise various analyses aimed at determining its existence. 78 
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the Supreme Court issued its own interpretation of dependent Indian conununity as land (1) set aside for the use of Indians and (2) under federal supervision. m Thus, if a court finds that tribal land is neither a reservation nor an allotment, and does not meet the requirements for a dependent Indian community, the tribal sovereignty in terms of its jurisdiction is limited to its own members. The outcome produced by a court's Indian country analysis, then, essentially determines the degree of the tribe's inherent sovereignty that it may assert. The next section addresses the current permissible scope of tribal sovereignty by examining the general powers held by tribal governments and specific exercises of authority deemed permissible by the Supreme Court.
Scope of Tribal Sovereignty
Although tribes possess inherent sovereignty, it does not necessarily follow that such sovereignty is absolute. Throughout the history of the interaction between tribes and the United States, restraints on tribal sovereignty arose in the enactment of statutes and the creation of treaties, whereby tribes submitted to the protection and overriding sovereignty of the federal government.' The Supreme Court also found restraints on tribal self-government implicit in the relationship between the tribes and the federal government, which it characterized as a guardian-ward or trust relationship.' Otherwise, "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."
' As a consequence of the various sources of restraints on the tribes' powers of selfgovernment, the specific scope of tribal sovereignty changed over the years.
In general, the scope of tribal sovereignty is evident in the various powers exercised by tribal governments. Among the fundamental powers of tribes are the powers to establish a chosen form of government, administer justice, determine tribal membership, exclude people from tribal lands, and charter business organizationsOu Tribal governments also enjoy the flexibility of a police power and sovereign immunity from suit. However, the precise scope of a tribe's sovereignty depends on which criteria the courts and legislature base their conceptions of sovereignty.' Two views are possible: one is based on tribal membership, and the other is based on territory or geographic boundaries.' A membership-based conception of sovereignty only recognizes the tribe's sovereignty over its own members, whereas a territorial-based conception of sovereignty generally recognizes the tribe's sovereignty over members, nonmembers and non-Indians within the tribe's geographic boundaries."
The Court utilized both conceptions in past opinions, but a membershipbased conception of tribal sovereignty has prevailed recently. This is particularly evident in the tribal criminal jurisdiction context. While the Court recognized tribal criminal jurisdiction over members, it later declined to do so when it came to non-Indians 9 ' and even nonmember Indians, stating that "in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority." 93 Although Congress subsequently provided for tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers,' the fact that it had to delegate such authority says little for the retained inherent sovereignty of the tribes.
In the civil jurisdiction arena, the Court was more willing to accept a territorial-based view of tribal sovereignty until very recently. One Court decision recognized exclusive tribal court civil jurisdiction in actions with nonsovereign immunity is a matter of federal law. The Supreme Court has held that tribes are immune from suit in federal court, but tribal officials are not immune from suits seeking injunctive relief. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The immunity extends to both reservation and trust lands, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Indian llalntiffs and Indian defendants." The Court also held that tribal courts presumptively have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians and that non-Indian defendants must exhaust tribal court remedies before challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal courts." In each case, the Court's holding signals a greater acceptance of territorial-based sovereignty, although the focus on the party's status as an Indian or non-Indian suggests that membership plays a role.
A more recent case highlighted this aspect of the Court's holdings, in which the Court held that a tribe does not have jurisdiction over civil actions between non-Indians, where the facts underlying the action occurred on a federally granted right-of-way over a reservation.' Although the non-Indian status of the parties made it unnecessary to draw a distinction between a membership versus territorial-based view, the Court essentially declined to accept the latter when it denied the tribe civil jurisdiction over activities occurring within its reservation's boundaries. Nevertheless, the Court seems to accept a broader view of tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction in civil rather than criminal actions, by virtue of its willingness to give less importance to membership.
The Court's decisions addressing regulatory authbrity of tribes also point towards a diminished recognition of tribal sovereignty by rejecting a territorialbased view. The Court declined to recognize tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers on land not owned by the tribe, but within a reservation's boundaries, in the absence of a consensual relationship or activity threatening the general welfare of the tribe." Another case concerning the zoning authority of a tribe over alienated land within its reservation led a majority of the Court to deny it jurisdiction, with a conflict of opinion over the role that membership had on the issue." Thus, the Court rejected a territorial-based notion of the tribe's sovereignty while not fully embracing a membership-based view. The Court similarly rejected tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians in a later case, where the lands in question were within the tribe's reservation but had been taken by the federal government for flood control purposes."' In short, the Court chose to reject a territorial-based approach to tribal sovereignty by allowing ownership of the affected land to override the fact that it is within a reservation's boundaries. Thus, membership of the parties whose When reviewing assertions of tribal sovereignty and making determinations of the appropriate scope permissible, as with any statutory construction, courts will look to congressional intent in any relevant statutes."°u In addition to looking for such intent in the relevant statutes and treaties, courts may look to the prevalent Indian policies." Thus, the policies existing during the past forty years are relevant to congressional intent as to the scope of Alaska Native sovereignty. As background, a general review of the historical and present federal Indian policies follows.
C. Federal Indian Policies
The federal government adopted numerous policies towards American 104. See generally CLINTON ET AL., supra note 57, at 137-65 (discussing the history of federal policy towards Native Americans); COHEN, supra note 7, at 47-206 (same).
105. See generally CLINTON ET AL., supra note 57, at 137-65 (discussing the history of federal policy towards Native Americans); COHEN. supra note 7, at 47-206 (same).
106. SKINNER, supra note 29, at 4, 13. Whereas the preceding policies all represented an attempt at segregating the American Indians from the non-native population, the federal government changed its policy focus towards the end of the reservation policy era to one aimed alt assimilating the native population into the mainstream." 7 Congress attempted this new change in policy primarily by an act" providing for the allotment of reservation lands to individual Indians and the sale of "surplus" strengthening tribal control over federal programs,' and maximizing tribal jurisdiction in child custody and adoption proceedings involving Indian children.' 39 Self-determination remains the current federal policy towards American Indians and Congress reaffirmed it throughout the 1980s and 1990s.' 4 The federal policies toward American Indians are equally applicable to Alaska Natives; indeed, an assertion regarding the loss or termination of Alaska Native sovereignty necessarily must be phrased and measured in terms of the sovereignty of American Indian tribes. To make such a comparison requires an awareness of the similarity in the context of Alaska Native and American Indian sovereignty. To that end, the next section provides a background on the Alaska Native context.
D. Context of Alaska Native Sovereignty
Despite Alaska Natives having a distinct history, a different organization, and a younger relationship with the federal government, the federal principles pertaining to American Indians also apply to them. 4 ' Thus, it is not only necessary but also appropriate to measure the termination of Alaska Native sovereignty in terms of American Indian tribal sovereignty. The following briefly describes the historical relationship that Alaska Natives share with the federal government and their political organization. 140. See SKINNER, supra note 29, at 67. President Clinton, while hosting a meeting of tribal leaders at the White House, also voiced support for the self-determination policy, stating: "Today I reaffirm our commitment to self-determination for tribal governments." TliOMAS R. BERGER, 
Alaska Native Historical Relationship with Federal Government
The historical relationship between the United States and Alaska Natives initially differed from its relationship to American Indians. 4 ' For almost thirty years after the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867," 43 the territorial government made little distinction in the applicability of the law between non-native and native residents of the Alaska territory.'" Both natives and non-natives seemed to be subject to the territorial laws, 45 and federal statutes'" implied that Alaska Natives did not have aboriginal land rights like those recognized for American Indians.' 47 However, subsequent acts of Congress 48 singled out Alaska Natives from non-natives for certain federal programs. 49 The Bureau of Indian Affairs assumed responsibility over the administration of Alaska Native matters in 144. The Organic Act of 1884 provided for federal educational services regardless of the recipients race, the administration of which was done by the Bureau of Education rather than the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 13, 23 Stat. 24, 127-28, cited in CASE, supra note 142, at 7. The Alaska Federal District Court held in In re Sah Quah that a group of Alaska Natives was subject to the Thirteenth Amendment just as all United States residents were.
In re Sah Quah, 1 Alaska Fed. 136 (1886), cited in CAsE, supra note 142, at 7. 
It was not until

No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
recognition of their communities as autonomous bodies on par with American Indians shows that the general trust relationship, the tribal sovereignty principles, and the general federal policies towards Indians apply to all Native Americans, including Alaska Natives.
Political Organization
Following contact with Russians and Americans, many Alaska Native villages established councils with characteristics reflecting the influence of nonnatives."
: Many also organized as municipalities, first under Territorial and later under State law. The wide variety of political organizations is important when making a broad generalization regarding sovereign status. Those villages that organized as municipalities will most likely remain unaffected by changes in federal law, as they received their power from, and are organized under, state law."' Similarly, traditional village governments or councils established of the natives' own volition may be influenced by such changes differently than tribal governments and corporations organized under the Indian Reorganization Act, which is federal law. Thus, the political context is crucial to understanding the full ramifications of the process of the de facto termination described below.
I. The Termination of Alaska Native Sovereignty
The federal government did not statutorily terminate Alaska Native sovereignty, yet this sovereignty was in effect terminated. Nevertheless, this Article best illustrates the de facto termination of Alaska Native sovereignty by analogizing to the statutory, or de jure, process of termination provided by certain statutes during the era when a federal policy of termination prevailed. It should be noted, however, that the de jure process described is not explicitly one of terminating tribal sovereignty. Rather, the termination of tribal sovereignty was an incidental effect of the process's express goal, which was terminating the trust relationship with the federal government."w 
A. De Jzure Termination
There were a number of federal termination statutes passed in the 1950s and 1960s, but many of them were essentially identical in substance. 6 This Article examines the provisions contained in the termination statute for the The termination statute governing the Western Oregon Indians provided for the removal of federal restrictions on tribal and individually owned property, after which the federal trust relationship terminated 7 " As a consequence, the services provided for the members because of their status as Indians were discontinued.' Also, the laws applicable to Indians generally no longer applied.17
The Western Oregon Indians termination statute also contained a provision establishing a procedure for transfer of tribal property." It gave the tribes the option of transferring title to a "corporation or other legal entity" or a tribally designated trustee to manage the property." 7 ' Alternatively, the statute provided for the sale of the property with a pro rata distribution of the proceeds to tribal members 7 Another consequence of statutorily terminating the federal trust relationship with the Western Oregon Indians was the application of state law to the tribes and their members. 76 The statute provided that state laws were to apply "in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or other persons within their jurisdiction."" Following distribution of tribal property, both the property and income derived from it also became subject to state taxation."
Result of De Jure Termination
As the Western Oregon Indians statute indicated, the termination legislation of the 1950s read in terms of ending the federal trust relationship with specific tribes.' To implement that goal, some statutes provided for the actual sale 
179.
A common declared purpose of the termination statutes was to "provide for the termination of Federal supervision over the trust and restricted property" of the tribe. E.g., Act
[Vol. 24 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss2/5 of tribal land with the proceeds distributed among the members."* Other statutes gave members the option of either changing the federal trusteeship into a private trust and receiving payments or transferring ownership of the land into member-controlled state-chartered corporations. ' Additionally, the statutes provided the states with legislative and judicial jurisdiction, including taxing authority, over the individual members of the affected tribes. ' The result of the termination statutes was that affected tribal governmentsno longer had jurisdiction over the former tribal land," and tribal law no longer applied in either criminal or civil cases arising on any remaining tribal land.' In legal terms, the land was no longer Indian country, as the federal trust relationship is a crucial component to reservation, allotment, and dependent Indian community status." Because Indian country became a necessary component to an assertion of tribal sovereignty," 6 the statutes terminated the affected tribes' sovereignty, as well as the federal trusteeship. As the following section explains, the termination of Alaska Native sovereignty resulted in a similar fashion.
B. The De Facto Termination of Alaska Native Sovereignty
Although not contained in tribe-specific legislation, the collective provisions of Public Law 280 and ANCSA are quite similar to the termination statutes, including the one applicable to the Western Oregon Indians. In addition to providing for a similar process, Public Law 280 and ANCSA similarly result in the termination of tribal sovereignty for Alaska Natives. The Venetie decision confirms this conclusion, by holding that land owned in fee by an Alaska Native tribal government is not Indian country. The next two sections compare the process and result of the de facto termination of Alaska Native sovereignty to the de jure process and result outlined above. 
Process of De Facto Termination
Whereas the termination statutes represented an immediate and direct effort by Congress to end the trust relationship with the affected tribes and implement the various provisions, Public Law 280 and ANCSA represent a drawn out effort without an explicit congressional commitment to any specific result." Nevertheless, the two statutes provide for a similar process -they remove federal restrictions on alienability, transfer tribal property to corporations, and transfer federal jurisdiction over the affected lands to the state.
Just as the termination statute for the Western Oregon Indians terminated the federal trust relationship with the Western Oregon Indians, ANCSA's express policy was that "the settlement should be accomplished ... without creating a .. .lengthy wardship or trusteeship."IU To that end, ANCSA similarly provides for the expiration of alienability restrictions on land held by the regional and village corporations after a twenty-year period." A subsequent amendment to ANCSA provides the corporations with the power to extend that period, but it is phrased in such a manner as to still require the eventual removal of alienability restrictions."
ANCSA also provides for a transfer of tribal property to state chartered corporations, just as the Western Oregon Indians termination statute had. To settle Alaska Native land claims, ANCSA requires villages to organize as shareholders into for-profit or nonprofit corporations (as "village corporations")... and that Alaska Natives organize into thirteen different "regional corporations" under Alaska state law." ANCSA charges the regional corporations with administering the disposition of the funds'" and retaining title to the subsurface estates of the lands conveyed to the village corporations," while the village corporations hold title to the surface upon the powers of self-government that they previously exerciseda but also upon the Court's interpretation of the "Indian country" status of the tribal land over which those powers would be exercised. For this reason, the Court's decision in Venetie is crucial to determining the role of Alaska Native tribal governments after Public Law 280 and ANCSA.
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,' the Supreme Court held that lands owned in fee simple by a tribal government following ANCSA did not constitute Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. 21 The Court based its holding on a determination that land included in the claims settlement did not constitute a dependent Indian community because (1) it was not really set aside for the use of Alaska Natives, considering the expiration on alienability restrictions, and (2) the land was no longer under federal supervision once the corporations took title. 2t ' In holding that the land was not Indian country, the Court approved of the district court's original opinion that the tribal government could not tax the activities of a nonmember private contractor doing business on such land owned in fee simple by the tribal government."
An interesting aspect of the Venetie case is that ANCSA provided the Native Village of Venetie tribal government with the option of taking corporate title to its former reservation land and foregoing other land and cash benefits of the settlement," an option that the tribal government elected to In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court issued its own interpretation of dependent Indian community and found that the tribal land in question was not Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b). The Court looked to United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), the case initially influencing Congress to include the dependent Indian community provision in the Indian country statute to support its requirement that land be (1) set aside for the use of Indians and (2) be under federal supervision in order to constitute a dependent Indian community. Under this interpretation, the Court justifiably found it difficult to say that the land was a dependent Indian community, because ANCSA evidenced neither a congressional intent for federal set-aside nor a method of federal superintendence.
211. See supra note 210 (discussing the Court's dependent Indian community analysis). exercise.'" The corporation subsequently transferred title to the tribal government in fee simple. 2 5 Thus, a tribal government, rather than a corporation, owned the land in question in Venetie. This fact strengthens the significance of the holding for tribal governments that do not hold title to the relevant land!" The next section addresses the implications of the Venetie decision as it relates to the de facto termination of Alaska Native sovereignty. This is accomplished by comparing the scope of sovereignty now permitted of Alaska Native tribal governments to the permissible scope of tribal sovereignty of tribes in general.
Measurement of Alaska Native Sovereignty. Implications of De Facto Termination
In Alaska, Public Law 280 set the stage for the de facto termination of Alaska Native governmental entities. It imposes state jurisdiction over tribal lands without consent of the Alaska Native population, impairing the ability of tribal governments to self-govern" The process of de facto termination continued with the enactment of ANCSA. ANCSA forces the transfer of lands held by Alaska Natives to state-chartered corporations, just as several termination statutes did in the 1950s and 1960s."' By ending the trust relationship with respect to Alaska Native land holdings, the lands became alienable 1 and consequently subject to state taxation and foreclosure.
These changes by themselves make tribal self-government over such lands much more difficult, thereby limiting the sovereignty of the tribal governments. But what, precisely, is left of Alaska Native sovereignty? That question is best answered via comparison to the scope of tribal sovereignty generally recognized for American Indian tribes.' 214. COHFN, supra note 7, at 747 n.81. 215. Id. 216. A tribal government that owns the land over which it seeks to assert authority, as in the Venetie case, presumably has a stronger basis for doing so than it would if the land was owned by an ANCSA corporation. The ownership issue is significant because nonmembers may eventually become part-owners of the land when alienability restrictions expire on the corporate stock. Assuming that members consent to be governed because of their voluntary decision to be a member, it follows that tribal government-owned land would be a stronger candidate for tribal authority because consent of the governed would not be an issue. The Venetie Court refused to recogniz-. that authority. Therefore, the Venetie decision seems to foreclose the exercise of tribal authority over lands held by ANCSA corporations as well. 218. See discussion supra Part H.B.I (comparing ANCSA provisions to termination statute provisions).
219. ANCSA did contain a provision, however, exempting land from state and local property taxes for up to 20 years provided that they are not developed, leased, or used for purposes other than exploration. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d)(1) (1994 In other words, without jurisdiction over the land, the tribal governments in Alaska may only exercise authority over their own members.
In the criminal context, this membership-based conception deprives the tribal governments of jurisdiction over nonmember Alaska Natives or Indians over which they would otherwise have jurisdiction. In the civil context, the tribal governments no longer have presumptive jurisdiction over non-Indian or nonmember Indian defendants as do non-Alaskan tribal governments.' The regulatory jurisdiction of Alaska Native tribal governments is another matter, as Public Law 280 did not provide state regulatory jurisdiction.' Thus, tribal regulatory authority would seem necessary to fill a void of authority. However, it is uncertain how broad courts may read Venetie in the future, and the tribal governments will experience difficulty enforcing regulations beyond its own membership without criminal and civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.
After the Venetie decision, Alaska Native tribal governments face an uncertain future regarding the practical ability to self-govern. Without having any authority over nonmembers residing or conducting business on tribal land, the tribal government's effectiveness is impaired substantially. This forces dependence on the state to exercise jurisdiction where the tribal government supposedly is without the power to do so, complicating the selfgovernment of the tribe. When a tribal government may no longer exercise jurisdiction over people residing, working, or conducting business on tribal land, it is hardly a sovereign entity. For Alaska Native tribal governments, it is more appropriate now to merely characterize them as groups of Alaska Natives voluntarily organized into tribal corporate vehicles or village "governments." Their sovereignty has eroded to the extent that they even lack the autonomous attributes of Alaska municipalities, which are themselves merely subdivisions of the sovereign state.'m Between Public Law 280, ANCSA, and Venetie the federal government effectively terminated the sovereignty of Alaska Natives.
The power that the federal government relied upon in reaching that result lacks a proper basis. Also, the Court's conclusion in Venetie suffers from specious reasoning. For these reasons, the process of the de facto termination of Alaska Native sovereignty is untenable, as the following explains.
III. The Untenable Process of De Facto Termination
When one considers the tribal sovereignty principles set out in Part B, supra, in light of the only constitutional source of power even pertaining to Native Americans, the Commerce Clause m the processes of both de jure and de facto termination outlined above should appear extralegal and unsupportable. Both processes exceed the power originally granted in the Commerce Clause. Two possible explanations follow for how the federal government gradually assumed such a magnitude of power enabling it to define the existence and scope of tribal sovereignty.
A. Enigmatic Origin of Plenary Power
The drafters and amenders only mentioned "Indians" and "Indian Tribes" ' ' at three places within the United States Constitution and its amendments. Article I provides that the government shall exclude "Indians not taxed" from the determination of the apportionment of Representatives and taxes. ' The Fourteenth Amendment, which excludes Indians from the amended method of apportionment, reaffirms the article I provision."' Neither provision purports to grant any power over Indians to the federal government. Rather, the provisions merely explain the method of apportioning Representatives and taxes among the states. 
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Published To best understand the tenuous relationship, it helps to view the Court's rationale in reverse order. Critical to an understanding of the relationship is the premise that, because the tribal government does not have jurisdiction over the tribal lands, the retained sovereignty virtually is nonexistent. As noted above, the Venetie Court approved of the district court's conclusion that because the tribal lands were not Indian country, the tribal government could not tax the activities of a nonmember contractor conducting business on the tribal land. 5°T hus, the Court essentially utilized the reasoning that the tribe has no jurisdiction over the tribal land because it is not Indian country. The Court's explanation for why the tribal land is not Indian country is clear and logical, but the tenuous relationship remains: how does a statute allocating federal criminal jurisdiction by defining Indian country support the role of determining the existence and scope of tribal sovereignty?
To restate the Court's reasoning: the land in question is not Indian country; because the land is not Indian country, the tribe does not have jurisdiction over an activity merely because the activity occurred on tribal lands. It naturally follows that, if a tribal government does not have jurisdiction over its landbase, then its sovereignty is an illusion. The Court's emphasis on a membershipbased conception of sovereignty denies such a tribal government jurisdiction over its territory."
1 The result is that the tribal government's sovereign status ceases to exist, and the reasoning supporting that result relies on a statute that Congress enacted to allocate federal, not tribal, criminal jurisdiction over native lands.
Conclusion
Over the past forty years, the federal government took actions that have the effect of virtually terminating the sovereignty of Alaska Native groups. This When one also considers the tenuous relationship between the allocation of federal jurisdiction and recognition of tribal sovereignty, the process of de facto termination that occurred seems untenable. The bottom line is that the elusive nature of Alaska Native sovereignty is an anomaly in an era of selfdetermination. [Vol. 24
